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The writer is director of regional security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
And so begins the latest brazen and wholly predictable gamble from America and Israel to shape the Middle East to their liking.
Too many have mistakenly believed or chosen to believe that President Donald Trump is averse to war or was conducting subtle coercive diplomacy to obtain limited concessions from Tehran. If Trump cares deeply about a few things (think tariffs, Greenland, building the wall), on most other issues he is a vessel for others to steer with promises of swift victory and glory. Iran is one of these issues. His hawkish advisers and Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, have manoeuvred skilfully to get him to a place where war was inevitable.
Soon after bombs began dropping, Trump unambiguously called for regime change. Once he decapitates the regime, he suggested, it will be up to the Iranian people to seize the gift. He also claimed, without evidence, that the campaign will “defend the American people by eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime.” Israel’s foreign minister echoed this logic, calling the strikes “preemptive”. Not many believe these arguments, but this doesn’t matter.
Trump and Netanyahu are now going for the jugular. US and Israeli aircraft and cruise missiles have attacked Iran’s leadership sites, command structures and missile facilities. Iran’s supreme leader, its president and its senior security commanders remain invisible at present. The damage to Iran’s decision-making and military structures is likely to be massive. Iranian authorities have called on residents to leave the capital.
But the regime was prepared to strike back and it is seeking to hit hard and fast. Breaking with Iran’s self-restraint in previous cycles, a senior Revolutionary Guards official has said all red lines have been lifted. Since Iran cannot defend itself, the thinking goes, it must quickly impose a significant cost on others so they in turn push a stop in the fighting.
Iran’s missile crews responded within hours of the attacks, evidence of a decentralised response to launch continuously regardless of whether the leadership in Tehran is alive and functioning. Iran used its vast arsenal of precise short-range ballistic missiles, which survived last summer’s 12-day war, against the targets closest to its shore. At the time of writing, several waves of Iranian strikes ostensibly aimed at US bases have been reported in Bahrain, the UAE and Kuwait, while missiles were reportedly intercepted above Qatar, Iraq, Jordan and Syria.
The question now is whether Iran can sustain the tempo. Every time its military launches a missile, it leaves a trace that superior US and Israeli air and intelligence systems can use to destroy the launchers, whose numbers are limited. And units spread across the country will struggle to maintain readiness and secure resupply without central command.
Iran’s escalatory options include the harassment of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz to drive oil prices up and force the US Navy, which prefers to operate at a distance, to expose itself in the waters of the Gulf. But this too is risky as Iran’s coastal energy-exporting infrastructure is vulnerable to US retaliation, which would cut it off from trading. And many of Iran’s partners in the region are now likely to mobilise.
Iran is calculating that pain in the Gulf, depletion of defensive munitions in the US and Israel and international anxiety will force a shorter campaign. The very opposite may take place. Official statements from Saudi Arabia and other states but also private commentary express considerable anger at Iran. They expected their diplomacy to shield them from Iran’s fury but videos of a large explosion at the US base in Manama and of missile interceptions in the UAE show the very opposite of what Gulf governments, their sheltered nationals and wealthy expatriates expect life there to be.
Should strikes intensify, Gulf states may well relax their opposition to the US use of their military infrastructure and airspace. Western countries too are facing dilemmas. With Ukraine and Greenland on their mind, many are lining up to support a war they don’t necessarily believe in. If called upon by their Gulf partners to act on their defensive commitments, they may even have to join the campaign. Even among those who condemn the attack, there is little patience or sympathy for Iran. The bloody repression of the protest movement in January and Iran’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine remain fresh in everyone’s mind.
One should not be dazzled by the military advantage America and Israel have displayed in the early hours of this conflict. What matters is how the war ends — and Trump’s America is not likely to manage the long-term regional mess it is creating.