There are few secrets in football these days.
Glutinous amounts of analytics, footage and data means clubs can conceal less tactically. There are no enigmas to solve. Not in the Premier League, anyway.
The longer a manager or a team are together, particularly when they are flourishing, the harder it is to maintain success. Oppositions proactively find ways to nullify their strengths and expose weaknesses.
It is a testament to Unai Emery’s Aston Villa, three-and-a-half years in, that their success largely endures. Emery’s overarching principles remain the same, with only subtle changes every match.
Since his arrival in October 2022, no Premier League side has attacked through central areas more. His middle-centric system is built on midfield overloads, aided by two No 10s.
This term is a continuation of the same style, with only Brighton & Hove Albion (30 per cent) attacking centrally more than Villa (29 per cent). More broadly, the image below is a snapshot of how Villa have evolved in the previous four seasons and where on the pitch they are enjoying their highest share of touches.
Villa’s attacks come through midfield insertion, cutting through opponents’ lines and in the path of the No 10s, with Morgan Rogers the chief creator.
His goal at Bournemouth earlier this month was his eighth of the campaign. Those goals had been worth 12 points to Villa, with no Premier League player proving more valuable in front of goal.
Increasingly, Villa are dependent on Rogers. That is borne of his distinct talent, but also the reality that the attacking cohort around him, including Ollie Watkins, Leon Bailey and Emiliano Buendia, have demonstrated erratic form.
Emery acknowledged Villa were “lucky to have” Rogers after Bournemouth, with the rest of the Premier League echoing that sentiment. They know if they negate Rogers, the chances of Villa’s attack functioning are considerably reduced.
Consequently, a theme has developed. Villa’s downturn in form can be directly linked to opposing sides deploying similar setups out of possession. Teams are packing out central areas and blocking passing lanes into Villa’s No 10s.
Morgan Rogers moves in to challenge Wolves’ Joao Gomes (Michael Regan/Getty Images)
Villa’s rising failings were exposed at Wolves. The 2-0 defeat, only Wolves’ second win of the season, was damning. Villa encountered the same tactical issues, exacerbated by a vacuum of work-rate and intensity.
That is not an accusation often levelled at this group, yet the most stinging criticism should be that Villa appeared the ones rooted to the foot of the table, with their counterparts fighting for a Champions League spot.
Emery marched down the tunnel before the final whistle. His pained expression betrayed a manager toiling with how to solve Villa’s inability in forward areas and the complete absence of ideas. His starting XI, underlined by his persistence with Watkins, misfired and second-half changes worsened the performance.
Villa have won one of the previous five league matches, but this was the most concerning.
The scenes at full-time, with Emery already departed, Tammy Abraham apologising to the away supporters and captain Ezri Konsa being restrained from walking towards them, were indicative of a team enduring widening cracks and tactical flaws.
Frankly, Wolves executed a rather predictable strategy, copying the template from the reverse fixture in late November and in which Emery accepted his side had been fortunate to win. This time, they had no such luck.
Rob Edwards organised Wolves in a back five, within a 5-2-2-1 formation, with a box midfield matching Villa and tasked with stopping passes centrally. “When they had the ball, I felt like we were in a good place,” said Edwards afterwards.
Emery had responded by pushing Rogers into a second striker position, like in the first match, but Edwards’ three centre-backs ensured defensive cover.
Back then, the difference was Boubacar Kamara’s left-footed strike from outside the box. Shooting from distance can be a conducive way to break down a mid-to-low block, with Villa scoring 13 goals from outside the box this season. Nonetheless, an xG of just 4.33 from that total suggests it is a low percentage play.
Villa were punished in a similar way to recent matches in which they shed points, notably against Leeds United.
Here, Leeds’ deepest midfielder, Ethan Ampadu, scans where Rogers is while the right centre-back, James Justin, steps onto Buendia.
Opponents within a back five have deployed three aggressive central defenders who can jump on Rogers, stopping him from turning and further reducing the space between the lines.
Brentford reverted to a comparable shape after being reduced to 10 men.
In the Leeds draw, Villa had 66.8 per cent possession. Since three straight victories when registering over 65 per cent possession initially under Emery, they have won only five of the ensuing 17 games when enjoying that much of the ball.
On the six occasions this season, Villa have won just once. The latest case was here at Wolves where they recorded 61 per cent possession. It is not a coincidence that Villa’s standout away victories this campaign have been when possession has been in the high 30s/low 40s.
Rogers was blunted and as the leader of Villa’s attack, was guilty of attempting to do too much. There is reason to argue the England international should spend more time on the left, outside the opponents’ defensive block and away from a crowded central midfield.
Tellingly, by the 55th minute, his fellow No 10, Buendia, had racked up as many fouls (five) as he had made passes in the final third — which was still one more than Rogers.
Breaking down mid-to-low blocks can require talented one-v-one soloists who can disrupt a defensive unit. Jadon Sancho has improved though is not entirely convincing Emery, while Bailey looks at sea owing to his grating predictability in taking three touches before cutting onto his left foot.
Leeds displayed a blend of high man-to-man marking when Villa attempted to circulate the ball in deep areas before dropping deeper, with three midfielders forcing Villa out wide. Wolves, meanwhile, stopped passes centrally but allowed Emery’s full-backs to carry the ball, knowing the key danger was in the middle.
Emery complained about the referee stifling the rhythm in the final 30 minutes at Molineux, although that should not disguise how laboured Villa were throughout. They do not have any reliable one-v-one dribblers in wide areas, with the slow passing tempo failing to drag opponents out of shape.
The image below illustrates Villa’s previous six passing networks in games. Against Leeds, for example, Bailey’s inclusion provided width but little end product.
Villa’s centralised system calls for penetrating passes through tight areas. This, however, requires a high level of precision. When confidence is affected and with injuries to the midfield technicians of Kamara, Youri Tielemans and John McGinn, Villa’s ability to thread eye-of-the-needle passes is wayward.
Heavy rainfall doused the quality at Molineux, but excuses wear thin in the context of Villa’s dire performance.
For all the choreographed patterns of play installed into players, plans were either forgotten or evaporated. Villa looked unsure of themselves, uncertain of how to attack, how to overcome the same tactical puzzles and, most poorly of all, how to compete against the league’s bottom side, who out-worked and outwitted them.